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Trends in Communist Media 8 Oct 75

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
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Trends in Communist Media

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

PRAVDA Editorial Article on Philosophy Shortcomings

~~Confidential~~

8 OCTOBER 1975
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

POLEMICS ON CHINESE ANNIVERSARY REFLECT WIDENING GAP

Soviet comment commemorating the PRC National Day on 1 October has underlined recent signs of a widening gap in relations between the two adversaries. The Soviet greetings message--from the USSR Supreme Soviet and State Council to the Chinese National People's Congress and State Council, just as was last year's--reflected the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations since 1974 and the stalemated negotiations on normalizing state relations by omitting previous Soviet avowals on the issue. Signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA were consonant with recent tough Soviet comment on China in being substantially harsher toward Maoist policies than similar commemorative articles in 1974. Moscow's stance is consistent with its pessimistic assessment of possible improvement in Sino-Soviet relations set forth in a KOMMUNIST editorial article in August,* as well as with the continuing stalemate in Sino-Soviet border negotiations in Peking, marked by the absence from China since early May of the chief Soviet negotiator.

Peking gave its usual curt treatment to Soviet commemoration of the anniversary. Authoritative Chinese comment on the concurrent 1 October 20th anniversary of the founding of Sinkiang Province, on the Sino-Soviet border, bluntly testified to PRC hostility by giving special stress to the danger of Soviet "surprise attack" against China.

SOVIET COMMENT

The Soviet comment reflected the more pessimistic stance Moscow has taken on improved ties with the PRC since the Chinese National People's Congress in January enshrined hostility to "social imperialism" in the revised PRC state constitution. The Soviet greetings message did not repeat last year's statements that improved bilateral relations would be consistent with the decision of the 24th Soviet congress, would enjoy "unanimous support from the entire Soviet people," or would serve to strengthen world socialism and contribute to international peace and security. It also refrained this year from specifying measures the USSR has undertaken in order to improve

* The August KOMMUNIST editorial article is the third such Soviet comment to be issued at this time each year since 1973, and it is Moscow's most authoritative comment since a PRAVDA editorial article last February on China's National People's congress. See the TRENDS of 27 August 1975, pages 14-15 for a discussion of the KOMMUNIST article as summarized by TASS on 20 and 21 August.

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ties, unlike 1974, when Soviet proposals for a treaty on non-use of force and a treaty of non-aggression with the PRC were mentioned as steps conducive to bettering relations.

The usual signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 1 October contained standard Soviet avowals of determination to rebuff Maoism while trying to normalize state relations, but unlike last year, they raised charges against China on sensitive bilateral disputes, including the border problem. PRAVDA referred specifically to Chinese territorial claims against the USSR and other Asian countries. Though IZVESTIYA claimed that Maoism "does not have a future," both commentaries depicted the current Peking regime as thoroughly in control of China and institutionalizing a solid anti-Soviet direction in PRC policy that dimmed prospects for normalization. Not surprisingly, there was no reference to Brezhnev's relatively optimistic observation at the 24th Soviet Party Congress, highlighted in last year's PRAVDA commentary, about Moscow's confidence in the prospects for Sino-Soviet normalization.

CHINESE TREATMENT

NCNA's terse report on the 30 September PRC embassy reception in Moscow disclosed that, as he had last year, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev led the Soviet turnout. NCNA as usual identified Ilichev as the head of the Soviet delegation to the Peking border talks. NCNA, as in past years, also replayed this year's Soviet greetings message.

Typical of the hardline anti-Soviet Chinese invective marking the 1 October Sinkiang anniversary was a speech by PRC Politburo member and Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien at a 29 September Urumchi rally. As reported by NCNA, Chen warned his audience to prepare against the danger of superpower war, noting in particular that "we must never forget that the Soviet revisionists have not renounced their intention to subjugate our country," and adding that "we must do our work well and guard against surprise attack by the Soviet revisionists." NCNA reported on 2 October that Chen and other PRC officials personally congratulated representatives of the Sinkiang militiamen who captured the crew of an intruding Soviet helicopter in March 1974.

PEOPLE'S DAILY ATTACKS GROMYKO DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

Authoritative Peking press reaction to Soviet disarmament proposals set forth in Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23 September UN General Assembly address has been voiced in a 7 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. The article, which marks the first authoritative comment in the Chinese party daily responding to

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such disarmament proposals since the fall of 1972, repeated the criticism in PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's UNGA speech on 26 September, but employed notably harsher language.* Commentator focused primarily on denouncing Moscow's current plan for a total ban on testing nuclear weapons and gave routine criticism to other current Soviet initiatives.

Commentator depicted the various plans put forward by Gromyko as "a sheer lie of Goebbels' style," and an "out-and-out fraud." He said that the USSR has merely been using the "smokescreen" of detente to expand nuclear armaments, "gradually catching up with and in certain respects surpassing those of the other superpower."

NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BAN DENOUNCED Commentator called Gromyko's proposal prohibiting nuclear weapons testing merely a rehash of "rotten stuff" "handed down from the Khrushchev period." He reaffirmed China's stance that the "only way" to eliminate the nuclear threat and war was by complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. And he restated the Chinese demand that the superpowers and other nuclear countries must agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, in order to provide the "first step" toward ending nuclear war.

The article claimed that the USSR was presently advocating a ban on nuclear weapons testing since "it has conducted enough tests" and thereby plans to use the ban "to bind other nuclear and non-nuclear countries hand and foot" and engage in "nuclear blackmail." It equated the current Soviet effort with its negotiation of the limited test ban treaty 12 years ago, after Moscow had "wantonly carried out nuclear tests in the atmosphere." Commentator also pointed out that the present Soviet proposal provided "enough leeway" for continued Soviet underground nuclear testing by stipulating that such tests can be conducted for "peaceful uses."

OTHER GROMYKO ARMS PROPOSALS The article dismissed as "worn-out themes" Gromyko's reiteration of Soviet calls for a 10 percent reduction in the military budgets of the five permanent Security Council members and for the convening of a world disarmament conference. Commentator devoted more attention to Gromyko's stress on the recent Soviet plan to

* Chiao Kuan-hua's 26 September speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 7-11. Sino-Soviet polemics on disarmament in the United Nations in 1972 are reviewed in the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 22-25.

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ban the manufacture of unspecified weapons of mass destruction. He charged that this was "an international laughing stock," since the Soviets "cannot explain clearly what they want to ban" but are merely using the proposal to divert world attention from the "urgent question" of total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

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INDOCHINA

PRG DENOUNCES U.S. PLAN TO RETURN REFUGEES UNILATERALLY

South Vietnamese authorities have reacted with mild indignation to the U.S. plan to unilaterally repatriate by ship a large group of disgruntled Vietnamese refugees who want to return home from Guam and the United States. Official Vietnamese communist reaction came in a 4 October PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which, while denouncing the U.S. proposal, stopped short of stating that the refugees would be refused admission if they returned to Vietnam. In recent months the plight of Vietnamese refugees who want to go back has received only scant attention in Vietnamese media. Monitored Vietnamese media comment and reportage accompanying the foreign ministry spokesman's statement has likewise been limited to a Liberation Press Agency commentary, broadcast on the 6th by Liberation Radio, and brief Hanoi radio reports--which reiterated the arguments of the spokesman's statement.

The relatively low-level foreign ministry spokesman's statement, while not taking a specific stand on whether the PRG would accept the refugees if returned by the United States, did make it clear that the Vietnamese communist authorities were dissatisfied with the United States for proposing to act without PRG "authorization." Characterizing the U.S. move as a "criminal act," the statement demanded that the Ford Administration "immediately stop it" and pointedly reminded the United States that the matter of authorizing the refugees' return was a "sovereign right of Vietnam" and should not be settled simply "according to the desires" of the United States.

The foreign ministry statement was also addressed to the refugees themselves. Professing a desire for an early end to the family separations caused by the U.S. evacuation, the statement noted that each of those who filed an application for repatriation would be considered by the PRG on a "specific case" basis. Then, in what could be construed as a threat to those who intend to return without PRG permission, the statement warned that the refugees should "protect themselves" by being "aware of the enemy plot and unite in struggling against the adventurous U.S. act."

BACKGROUND Previous Vietnamese media comment on the refugees shortly after the April communist takeover in the South had seemed to take the tack that they should be returned by the United States unilaterally, and had made no mention of the formality now being set forth by the PRG of deciding each case on

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an individual basis. For example, a 9 May Hanoi radio commentary on the reported "maltreatment of forced evacuees" demanded that the Ford Administration "return all the South Vietnamese forced evacuees to their homeland." A 25 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the refugees quoted Australian Prime Minister Whitlam to the effect that the best solution would be for the United States to let the refugees return to their own country. The same commentary also cited an unidentified UN spokesman as "acknowledging" that the PRG had a "cooperative attitude" and welcomed "those who . . . now choose to return." Subsequent sparse Vietnamese media comment and reportage on the refugees have dwelt more on what was described as their dissatisfaction with refugee camp life and their desire to return home, but without the earlier specific urgings that the United States allow them to do so.

PHNOM PENH MORE EFFUSIVE ON PRC ANNIVERSARY THAN ON DRV FETE

Phnom Penh comment on 1 October 26th anniversary of the PRC was markedly warmer than its comment marking the 2 September 30th anniversary of the DRV. This duplicates the pattern of Cambodian comment employed on these anniversaries in the past and underlines Phnom Penh's continuing differentiated approach to its own neighboring communist allies.

As in past years, Cambodian comment on the Chinese anniversary included congratulatory messages from Prince Norodom Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth to PRC Premier Chou En-lai, as well as Front radio comment, this year in the form of a radio editorial on 1 October. Cambodian leaders led by Penn Nouth also attended the 30 September PRC ambassador's reception in Phnom Penh.

Sihanouk's message to Chou En-lai hailed Peking's support for just national liberation struggles, noted China's "exemplary fraternal friendship and militant solidarity" with Cambodia, and extended his "highest, most grateful, most affectionate and admiring considerations." Sihanouk's message to Ton Duc Thang on DRV National Day had pointed out only that Cambodia is "a neighbor, intimate friend, brother, and comrade-in-arms" of Vietnam, and extended his "very high and fraternal consideration."

In extending "heartiest congratulations" and "best wishes" to China, the 1 October Phnom Penh radio editorial called China the "strong steel bulwark of the democratic and socialist movement for national liberation," and repeatedly expressed Cambodia's "most profound gratitude for the pure, sincere assistance and support" constantly rendered by Peking "in line with the principle of

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revolutionary internationalism." The 1 October editorial also noted that since the April liberation, Sino-Cambodian relations have become "increasingly intimate" and "mutual assistance and support increasingly active," setting an example for relations between a great nation and a small one. It called Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai "the closest and most intimate friends of the Cambodian people."

By contrast, Phnom Penh's radio editorial on 2 September on the DRV's 30th anniversary had only extended "warm greetings" to the Vietnamese people, recalled that the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos had "joined their seething efforts" against the common enemy of "U.S. imperialism," and included the long-standard statement of expectation that Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship would be "strengthened and forever developed on the path of equality and mutual assistance." Apart from hailing the "militant solidarity and everlasting friendship" between Vietnam and Cambodia, the editorial included no additional characterization of solidarity or mutual support between the two nations.

1974 OBSERVANCES

Cambodian comment on the PRC's anniversary last year had also been more effusive than its comment marking the DRV National Day. For example, last year's Phnom Penh radio article had hailed Peking's multiformal support for the Cambodian struggle and had enthusiastically discussed Sino-Cambodian solidarity. It had also called China Cambodia's "powerful support and reliable mainstay," expressed "deepest thanks" for Chinese moral, material, and political support, and saluted the health of Mao and Chou. Last year's Cambodian Front radio article on the DRV's anniversary had stressed standard themes of Cambodian-Vietnamese fraternity and solidarity in the common struggle, in a tone comparable to this year's radio editorial.

DRV'S OBSERVANCE OF PRC ANNIVERSARY MORE SUBDUED THAN 1974

North Vietnam's observance of the 1 October PRC National Day this year followed the standard pattern with the usual "grand meeting," congratulatory message, and editorial comment, with some evidence of less effusiveness on Hanoi's part.

Consistent with past years, VWP Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan headed the Vietnamese representation at the 29 September Hanoi meeting, while the customary Chinese reception hosted by Ambassador Fu Hao on the 30th saw the attendance of Premier Pham Van Dong, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, Foreign Minister Nguyen Van Trinh, and Hoang Van Hoan.

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This year's DRV greetings message to the PRC was slightly more subdued than last year's.* Vietnamese gratitude for Chinese help was merely expressed as "sincere and profound thanks . . . for great and effective assistance and support." In contrast, the 1974 DRV message had noted China's "wholehearted support and great, all-round and effective assistance."

This year's Hanoi message concluded by characterizing the two countries as "comrades and brothers" acting in the "spirit of proletarian internationalism."

DRV TREATMENT OF YUGOSLAV VISITORS REFLECTS NEUTRAL STANCE

Hanoi's treatment of the 2-6 October visit by a Yugoslav government delegation headed by Federal Executive Council President Bijedic laid heavy stress on the two countries' common goals of "independence, equality and mutual respect," while showing a relatively cool reaction to evident Yugoslav encouragement to Vietnam to become more actively engaged with the nonaligned states and follow the Yugoslav example. The Hanoi media's selective treatment of certain speeches and themes also reflected customary DRV caution about publicizing statements potentially polemical or offensive to either Moscow or Peking.

The joint communique on the visit, carried by TANJUG on the 6th and VNA the next day, expressed "satisfaction" with results of the 1974 DRV-Yugoslav agreements on "economic, scientific and technical cooperation" and on "trade and payments," and spoke of the need for further efforts to develop cooperation in all fields. No new economic or other agreements were announced; a TANJUG report on the April 1974 agreement signed at the conclusion of DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Yugoslavia had noted that it covered a five-year period.

TREATMENT OF DRV'S NONALINED STATUS

Yugoslav comment in advance of Bijedic's Asian tour had stressed its importance, particularly for developing stronger relations and strengthening the unity and role of nonaligned countries. A TANJUG commentary on the 28th noted that nonaligned unity was "essential" for preserving the independence and sovereignty of the nonaligned states. Reflecting Hanoi sensitivity about giving offense to Moscow by overplaying the DRV's own role among the nonaligned and its ties with Yugoslavia, DRV spokesmen and the media gave sparse, pro forma attention to the nonaligned role, including several paragraphs in the final joint communique which praised

* For a discussion of Hanoi's observance of the 1974 PRC National Day, see the TRENDS of 2 October 1974, page 4.

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the role of the nonaligned states in defending independence, freedom and economic sovereignty. Hanoi's seemingly middle-road position was spelled out in traditional terms by Pham Van Dong in his 2 October speech at a formal reception honoring the Yugoslav visitors. After describing in standard terms Vietnam's postwar task as building a "peaceful, unified, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam, a socialist Vietnam," Dong declared that this task required

that we reinforce the great friendship and the all-sided cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries, and at the same time expand good relations with the nonaligned countries, the Third World countries, and other countries in the world

Dong made only one passing reference to Yugoslavia's "positive participation" in the nonaligned movement, and his only other reference to nonalignment came in a Cambodian context, where he referred to Cambodians building a "really independent, peaceful, neutral, nonaligned, democratic and prosperous Cambodia. . . ."

HANOI TREATMENT OF
BIJEDIC SPEECHES

North Vietnam's circumspection in reporting the speeches by Bijedic reflected Hanoi's customary selective editing to avoid possible offense to Moscow or Peking, most recently illustrated by the Vietnamese media omitting Chinese criticism of Moscow during VWP First Secretary Le Duan's 25-28 September PRC visit.* On at least three occasions the DRV media omitted passages in Bijedic speeches, as carried by Yugoslav media, that could be construed as offensive particularly to the Soviet Union, given the recent relatively cool state of Moscow-Belgrade ties. VNA's account of Bijedic's 2 October Hanoi reception speech omitted a single passage where Bijedic, discussing the international situation, said: "Undemocratic methods and practice continue to be present in international relations. Political and economic pressures against developing countries, interference in internal affairs of other countries, and efforts to cause internal difficulties and to provoke putsches continue."

Briefly reporting Bijedic remarks during a 3 October visit to a Hanoi institute, Vietnamese media omitted his suggestion for "united actions" by "nonaligned" countries as a deterrent to the "policy of aggression, pressure and interference" in other countries' internal

* Le Duan's visit to the PRC is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, pages 12-14, and 1 October 1975 pages 13-15.

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affairs. And in reporting Bijedic's remarks at a 5 October reception he gave on the eve of his departure, VNA again omitted his statements about the similarity of the problems both countries faced, including "establishing equal and democratic relations in the international community," in a context where Bijedic seemed to be alluding to Soviet pressures upon Yugoslavia in the past year--without, however, naming Moscow. VNA confined its own account of Bijedic's remarks to generalities about the future of Yugoslav-Vietnamese relations and his expressions of gratitude for Vietnamese hospitality.

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PRC - YUGOSLAVIA

MAO MEETING HIGHLIGHTS VISIT OF YUGOSLAV DELEGATION

Peking has given a warm welcome and full honors to an official Yugoslav state delegation led by Premier Bijedic that arrived in China on 6 October, the highest level official Sino-Yugoslav interchange to date. Initial comment on the visit has demonstrated continuing bilateral differences over ideology and on international detente, but the main thrust of statements by both sides has stressed their identity of views on defending national independence and has testified to good prospects for broadening bilateral cooperation. The visit caps a series of recent Sino-Yugoslav military, economic, and scientific exchanges; and the identity of the negotiators at the Peking working-level talks suggests that agreements in these areas may be forthcoming.

The Yugoslavs were welcomed at Peking airport by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and met that evening with NPC Chairman Chu Te, Teng and other Chinese leaders before a banquet hosted by Teng, at which the Chinese vice premier and Yugoslav Premier spoke. The full delegation held its first reported working session with Chinese counterparts led by Teng on 7 October, and also toured a Chinese commune and attended a soiree that day. On the morning of the 8th, Teng was reported meeting alone with Bijedic, and the Premier and the rest of the delegation also met with Mao for a "friendly conversation" in a "cordial atmosphere."

Teng's welcoming speech on the 6th was replete with praise for past Yugoslav defense of national sovereignty and continuing vigilance against outside adversaries, noting that "any imperialism, if it dares to invade Yugoslavia, is bound to suffer a defeat even more ignominious than that suffered by old-line fascism." Teng went on to admonish his audience about the danger of superpower war, especially in Europe, reiterating the recent Chinese stress against the Soviet threat in stating that "the most dangerous source of war is the superpower that is more zealous in preaching peace."

Bijedic declared that both sides shared in common the building of a "new socialist society in conformity with our own conditions"---a line carefully avoided in PRC comment, as China still has not renounced its past view of Yugoslavia as ideologically "revisionist." Bijedic also differed with the Chinese in reaffirming Belgrade's advocacy of "the policy of detente and negotiation in Europe, and in the world at large."

Teng pointed out that bilateral efforts have given rise to "a good development" in Sino-Yugoslav relations in recent years, adding that

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Bijedic's visit would enhance "the friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries." Bijedic underlined the same theme in noting that "a significant level of cooperation, particularly in the economic field" had been achieved and in stating that the two sides must "invest still greater efforts" to promote "new forms" of cooperation. Neither side specifically referred to the possibility of military cooperation, but a Yugoslav and a PRC vice chief of staff were noted as attending the 7 October working talks with their economic and foreign policy counterparts.

Since the normalization of Sino-Yugoslav relations in 1969, official exchanges have increased, reaching a new high over the past year. The closer ties were underlined by unprecedented visits in May 1975 by a PRC vice chief of staff to Yugoslavia, and in October 1974 by a Yugoslav vice chief of staff to China. Both military delegations received warm, high-level treatment, with Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying receiving the Yugoslav visitors for a "cordial and friendly" talk on 26 October. Other recent bilateral interaction has included the November 1974 signing in China of an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, and the visit in September 1974 of a high-level Yugoslav parliamentary delegation which was received by Chu Te and Teng Hsiao-ping.

YUGOSLAVIA WELCOMES GROWTH OF STATE RELATIONS WITH PEKING

While Belgrade comment pegged to the start of Premier Bijedic's Peking visit characterized it as opening a "new stage" in state relations between the two countries, it was also careful to stress that ideological differences between the Yugoslav and Chinese communist parties are likely to remain for some time, and one Belgrade commentator cautioned that an improvement in relations with Peking would not be allowed to jeopardize relations with Moscow.

Typifying the comment, an article in the 6 October party daily POLITIKA, as reported by TANJUG on the 5th, portrayed the first Yugoslav head-of-government visit to Peking as a "culmination of a process of normalization of relations" which had begun when the two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1969, following an 11-year freeze in state relations. Similarly, a TANJUG commentary, published in the 28 September BORBA, asserted that previous lower-level exchanges between the two countries had provided a "solid basis" for a "full normalization of interstate relations" as well as for broader economic cooperation.

Belgrade also stressed the similarity of the two countries' positions on international questions. A Peking-dated TANJUG dispatch on the 5th, for example, noted their common stance against "colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism and support for liberation movements." Further comparing their foreign policies, the same dispatch asserted

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that "their views on a series of concrete international issues are similar in essence and their views on others differ only slightly." And in a somewhat obscure formulation which could be taken as veiled criticism of Moscow, POLITIKA, depicted the "anti-hegemonist" positions of Peking and Belgrade as "close . . . despite considerable differences."

Belgrade comment has repeatedly emphasized that the visit is taking place exclusively at the "state" level and that continuing ideological differences should not hinder the development of governmental ties. As if to dispel Soviet concerns that the visit could lead to a rapprochement between the two parties, the POLITIKA commentary claimed that it had "no ideological implications" and that Bijedic's talks "are not even likely to touch on" ideological differences. A Zagreb radio commentary by Milika Sundic on the 4th, however, evinced some interest in inter-party talks with the Chinese in implying that such an initiative from the CCP would be welcomed by Belgrade.

Sundic, who often voices stronger positions on sensitive issues than the official party organs, also suggested that Belgrade would not develop its relations with Peking at the expense of Moscow. He asserted that Peking's relations with Moscow and the other bloc countries "must in no way have a negative influence on Yugoslavia's cooperation with the European socialist states." Sundic also declared that Belgrade has no intention of involving itself in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

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NATO

MOSCOW: SCHLESINGER'S NATO TALKS FAILED TO WIN SUPPORT

Moscow comment on Defense Secretary Schlesinger's late September visit to West Europe for talks with NATO leaders on defense expenditures and standardization of arms production has routinely emphasized the contradictions and disagreements between the United States and its European allies. The visit was seen as a further effort to impose U.S. views and wring out additional defense funds for the dual purpose of safeguarding NATO against detente and continuing the arms race.


Most comment predictably emphasized that Schlesinger's visit was a "failure" and that his schemes had fallen on deaf ears in West Europe. "Not one" of the NATO countries expressed a desire to increase its military budget, TASS commentator Vladimir Goncharov stressed on 2 October, adding that there also was no support for U.S. proposals on standardization of arms production. Goncharov suggested that West Europeans realized production standardization in fact meant ever-increasing arms purchases from the United States. "Rivalry" between U.S. and West German arms manufacturers was also seen as a contributing factor to Schlesinger's failure. To top it all, the TASS commentator added, the talks on West German compensation for U.S. troops stationed in the FRG were also "abortive." An article in the 5 October RED STAR, co-authored by Colonel A. Markov and V. Vinogradov, took a similar line, but was somewhat less categorical. The weight of the NATO "bosses" would ultimately prevail, RED STAR claimed, and those member countries that wanted to reduce their expenditures and commitments to NATO would be compelled to maintain or even increase their participation.

A 1 October radio commentary by Valentin Zakharov, broadcast in German and well tailored to a West German audience, suggested that Schlesinger had found a more understanding audience in Bonn. Zakharov was quick to note that Schlesinger's talks with FRG Defense Minister Leber--on currency offset payments for U.S. troops stationed in the FRG, including the stationing of two new U.S. brigades, in addition to the standardization of arms production--would prove expensive for the inflation-ridden West Germans. Zakharov reminded his listeners that past American attempts to "burden" the Federal Republic with the costs of the U.S. military presence had "always been successful," and he wondered what the current talks would wind up costing the taxpayers. Zakharov also suggested sarcastically that the question of cooperation in the production of arms would probably be solved to the satisfaction of U.S. merchants, and of course at ever-escalating

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costs. The Leber-Schlesinger talks, he concluded, had served the purpose of fixing "political principles" of continued arms standardization and cooperation between the arms manufacturers of the two countries, not to mention furthering the arms race.



U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

DETENTE GETS NEW BOOST FROM SOME MOSCOW COMMENTATORS

In contrast to the predominately ambivalent tenor of Soviet comment on international affairs in recent months, some Moscow commentators have sounded a more positive note in discussing U.S.-Soviet relations. The most important expression of this revived optimism is an article by U.S.A. Institute international affairs expert G.A. Trofimenko in issue No. 9 of INTERNATIONAL LIFE, signed to press 20 August. Acknowledging that Soviet-U.S. relations have been adversely affected by temporary tensions and problems, Trofimenko leaves no doubt that he expects the detente trend to lead to further favorable developments between the two countries. Much the same theme is advanced in more limited scope by another U.S.A. Institute specialist, Yevgeniy Shershnev, in an article in RURAL LIFE on 27 September predicting a favorable development of Soviet-U.S. trade.

TROFIMENKO ARTICLE The theme of Trofimenko's article is that since the end of World War II U.S. policy has been adapting gradually to the need for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, but that this "restructuring" has been prolonged because of inertial factors and the long time it takes to progress beyond comprehending the need for change to acting on that recognized need. In drawing liberally on published U.S. official papers to document his history of Soviet-U.S. relations, Trofimenko seemed to be making a calculated effort to convince American readers of the plausibility of the Soviet view of these relations. On the present international situation, Trofimenko writes that a "definite transformation" is taking place in U.S. policy. He says the agreements signed between the two countries have created an "infrastructure" of relations and these relations have acquired a "definite stability." Trofimenko's only negative observations concern U.S. Congressional action in 1973 on the trade bill-Jewish emigration issue. Even on this issue, however, he suggests the possibility of an eventual solution, by saying that "many of those who voted for the adoption of the notorious stipulation are now beginning to realize that they obviously went too far."

SHERSHNEV ARTICLE Shershnev goes even further in suggesting that the impediments to U.S.-Soviet trade relations can be eliminated. The article dwells mainly on the prospects for longterm trade agreements, and it treats the subject with much the same optimism that characterized Soviet comment two years ago. Indeed, the main authoritative text cited was a speech

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made by Brezhnev during his 1973 visit to the United States. On specifics, Shershnev confined himself to citing examples of trade agreements already publicized, such as the reported Soviet arrangements with the Occidental Petroleum Company, and to generalizations about agriculture. Toward the end of his article, Shershnev referred to what he described as certain cold war attitudes in the United States, but he concluded on a strongly optimistic note, specifically citing the recent encouraging meeting in Moscow of U.S. congressmen and Soviet parliamentarians.

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USSR - EGYPT

MOSCOW OBSERVES NASIR DEATH ANNIVERSARY, IGNORES SADAT SPEECH

The fifth anniversary of the death of Egyptian President 'Abd an-Nasir, on 28 September 1970, was observed by Moscow in much the same fashion as previous years. Moscow again conveyed, through praise of an-Nasir's domestic policies and his support of Soviet-Egyptian ties, implicit criticism of the course taken by his successor. The anniversary materials this year have appeared unexceptional and even restrained in content, considering the target as-Sadat has offered in his series of public charges against the Soviet Union.*

The only notable feature of this year's anniversary treatment was the omission of any mention of as-Sadat's anniversary speech, which had been at least briefly reported the last three years. A short dispatch in PRAVDA on the 29th from the paper's Cairo correspondent pointedly ignored as-Sadat's anniversary address in reporting simply that a joint session of the ASU Central Committee and People's Assembly "was devoted to the late president's memory." And, as Soviet writers have done on previous occasions, PRAVDA's correspondent cryptically referred to an event which might portend trouble for the regime, in this case possible difficulties with university students over as-Sadat's policies. Thus the dispatch noted that "the traditional theoretical seminar devoted to an-Nasir's ideological legacy" was held at Ayn Shams University--an event apparently unmentioned in Cairo media. As-Sadat in his anniversary speech several times complained, in effect, of Soviet hypocrisy with respect to 'Abd an-Nasir, charging that the Soviet Union had attacked him during his lifetime but was now "glorifying" him and "wearing his mantle" today.

* Moscow has responded indirectly a few times to as-Sadat's criticism in broadcasts in Arabic and in the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic, complaining of Egyptian press attacks on Soviet policy. The practice of using 'Abd an-Nasir's name to counter as-Sadat's remarks and policies was typified in a Timoshkin commentary broadcast in Arabic on 7 October, Defending Soviet military and economic assistance to the Arabs, Timoshkin said an-Nasir had more than once declared that without Soviet-Arab cooperation Egypt and other Arab countries would have found themselves in a "critical position in the face of Israeli aggression."

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While both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have previously carried commemorative articles on the anniversary, this year only IZVESTIYA published the annual tribute, PRAVDA confining itself to the brief correspondent's report on anniversary functions in Egypt. IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA articles since 1971 have praised an-Nasir's socio-economic reforms such as agrarian measures and the "mighty" state sector, and have particularly stressed his role in founding and consolidating Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation. Focusing this year on an-Nasir's realization of the developing countries' need for an alliance with the socialist countries, IZVESTIYA cited the same an-Nasir quotation on the importance of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation that had been used in its 1974 article. And IZVESTIYA charged this year that the "aggressor" and its allies were trying to disrupt Arab unity and "drive wedges" between the Arab and socialist countries, as PRAVDA in 1971 had claimed that 'imperialist powers' were trying to isolate Egypt from the socialist states. PRAVDA articles in 1972 and 1973 had noted that an-Nasir countered attacks on Soviet-Egyptian relations from both external and internal enemies. PRAVDA's 1973 article had added that an ideological and political struggle was being waged around an-Nasir's legacy, with "pro-imperialist and reactionary circles" trying to consign his policies to oblivion.

The small volume of total comment on the anniversary this year was in line with previous years and, in the pattern of past anniversaries, Soviet media reported a memorial meeting at Moscow's House of Friendship. As in other years, Moscow radio's Arabic-language service broadcast various features pegged to the anniversary, and this year Moscow additionally publicized a biography of the "loyal son of the Egyptian people," released to coincide with the anniversary.

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USSR - PORTUGAL

MOSCOW GIVES PRO FORMA WELCOME TO PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES

Moscow observed all the amenities of protocol for the 1-4 October official visit of Portuguese President Costa Gomes, the first Portuguese head of state to visit the Soviet Union since diplomatic relations were established in June 1974.* Little of substance was apparent, however, in materials on the visit other than the announcement of the signing of agreements on cultural and scientific cooperation and on "long-term" economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. The atmospherics were variously characterized, TASS describing Costa Gomes' one session of talks with Podgornyy and Gromyko on the 1st as held in a "warm and friendly" atmosphere, while his meeting with Brezhnev on the 3d was called "friendly and businesslike," and the joint communique said it passed in a "spirit of broad accord."

Perhaps with an eye to U.S. admonitions that the Soviet attitude to Portugal might be a test case for the Helsinki accord, Moscow seemed to make an effort to surround the visit with references to CSCE. Podgornyy's dinner speech as well as the final documents--a joint communique and a "declaration"--focused in large measure on CSCE and disarmament questions as unobjectionable issues on which both sides could agree.

PODGORNYY SPEECH Nikolay Podgornyy set the tone for the visit in a bland dinner speech on the 1st, assessing the event as "an important step on the road of establishing and developing relations of friendship and cooperation." He praised Portugal's "persistent and heroic struggle" against the "fascist yoke," offering the vague assurance that the Portuguese "do not stand alone" in their struggle to consolidate the results of the revolution. (A little more forthcoming, a Glazunov foreign-language commentary on 30 September, anticipating the visit, said

* Foreign Minister Melo Antunes did not accompany Costa Gomes on his visits to Poland (27 September-1 October) or the USSR, postponing his departure and eventually canceling his trip due, according to Lisbon reports, to the "present political situation" in Portugal and strained relations with Spain. These difficulties did not prevent him from meeting in Paris with his French counterpart on 6 October. It is conceivable that his role in the ultimate ouster of former Prime Minister Goncalves may have affected his desirability as a member of the presidential entourage in Moscow.

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the Soviet Union was "ready to share our experiences and grant whatever help is asked of us.") Podgornyy told the guests, however, that the Portuguese people "and their vanguard political forces" must "define the ways for moving forward," and he expressed Soviet welcome for "every step taken to consolidate the unity of these forces"--a reminder of Moscow's interest in the fortunes of the Portuguese communists. Regarding bilateral relations, Podgornyy merely indicated that the two countries were "on the road" toward "friendship and cooperation," noting that "a lot has been achieved" since June 1974 and that "great significance is attached in the Soviet Union" to Costa Gomes' visit.

TALKS WITH LEADERS

Uninformative TASS accounts of Costa Gomes' official talks with Podgornyy and Gromyko and his meeting with Brezhnev conveyed little more than polite assurances from each side of satisfaction with the "considerable progress" in bilateral relations, and "willingness" to expand cooperation. TASS noted an "exchange of views" on international questions. Commentator Vladimir Larin, on Moscow radio's 5 October observers roundtable, could manage no more than the observation that the two countries "coincide in quite a few of their positions on a number of very important international questions."

Foreshadowing language in the final "declaration," TASS reported that "it was stressed especially" at the Brezhnev-Costa Gomes meeting that "no one should try to dictate to other peoples as to how they should settle their own internal affairs." The account thus left it unclear which side raised this particular point.

COMMUNIQUE,
DECLARATION

The two final documents covered much the same ground, with the communique in particular almost following the outline of Podgornyy's speech in touching on CSCE, MBFR, disarmament issues, decolonization, and the Middle East, as well as bilateral relations. The communique summed up the results of the discussions and the declaration affirmed the sides' future intentions with respect to the same issues.

The general Soviet practice is to issue only a joint communique, with declarations released only infrequently.* Two points in

* The USSR and NATO member Turkey issued a "declaration of principles" as well as a communique on Podgornyy's April 1972 visit to Ankara, and both communiqes and documents on principles of cooperation or relations were issued with France, in October 1971, and the United States, in May 1972.

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the joint declaration are of interest--though not surprising--in the Portuguese context--the principle of noninterference in other states' affairs, and the affirmation that provisions of the declaration do not affect prior obligations under international agreements. Both points are among the principles of interstate relations expressed in the Helsinki accord, both are among the principles long advocated by Moscow for insuring security in Europe and Asia, and both have appeared, for instance, in the Soviet-Turkish declaration in April 1972. Podgornyy in his dinner speech had asserted that the Soviet Union was "decisively" against any interference in Portugal's internal affairs, and the declaration's language on the right of a state to manage its own destiny "without any interference from the outside, direct or indirect" reflects the language of the Helsinki accord. However, the final sentence in this passage apparently derived from the Brezhnev-Costa Gomes meeting, and presented both sides as saying "they believe" that nobody should attempt to dictate to other peoples how they should manage their internal affairs.

Comment on the visit has underlined Soviet opposition to interference in Portugal's internal affairs. This was reiterated in an IZVESTIYA editorial article which was reported by TASS in Russian on the 6th. The article, which presumably appeared in IZVESTIYA's 6 October evening edition, was not carried in the paper's morning edition on the 7th as would normally be the case. TASS reported the IZVESTIYA editorial article as charging that "certain circles in the West are still trying to exert pressure on Portugal." And IZVESTIYA reaffirmed the Soviet Union's "close solidarity with the new Portugal," adding that the Soviet people's feelings of "genuine and deep sympathy" had characterized the atmosphere of Costa Gomes' visit.

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U S S R - G D R

HONECKER, BREZHNEV SIGN NEW FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN MOSCOW

Moscow and East Berlin marked the GDR's 26th anniversary on 7 October by concluding a new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance which deleted all references to the goal of eventual German reunification contained in the 1964 treaty and affirmed the GDR's close solidarity with the Soviet Union. The treaty was signed in Moscow by party chiefs Brezhnev and Honecker, the latter having arrived on an official friendly visit on the 6th. In an exchange of toasts at a reception that day for the GDR delegation, Brezhnev highly praised the GDR's domestic and foreign policies while Honecker reasserted the GDR's "firm and irrevocable" anchoring in the socialist community and alliance with the Soviet Union.

TREATY The signing of the new treaty represents a follow-up to the GDR's 25th anniversary, when a new GDR constitution which also deleted previous references to reunification went into effect. The treaty, the first such document concluded by Moscow for a 25-year period, supersedes a 20-year pact signed on 12 June 1964.

In contrast to the former treaty's provisions for "realization of Germany's unity" and negotiations leading to "creation of a peace-loving, democratic united German state," the new document stresses the inviolability of European borders "including the border between the GDR and the FRG" and identifies the GDR as a "sovereign independent socialist state." The new treaty is more explicit on the status of West Berlin than was the former treaty, in which the city was identified merely as "an independent political unit." The current treaty states that West Berlin is "not part of the FRG and that also in the future it will not be governed by it." It also states that Moscow and East Germany will "maintain and develop their relations" with West Berlin.

In another departure from the previous treaty, the provision on military assistance obligations of the two countries was brought into conformity with all but one of Moscow's treaties with the other Warsaw Pact states. The operative clause states that the countries will provide military assistance to each other in the

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event of an armed attack "by any state or group of states," whereas the previous treaty referred explicitly to an armed attack "in Europe" and did not specifically provide for "military" assistance.*

BREZHNEV In his 6 October reception toast, reported that day by Moscow radio, Brezhnev evaluated the new treaty as contributing to the "indestructible alliance" and "further rapprochement" of the two countries. In further praise of the solidarity with East Germany, he labeled the Socialist Unity Party and GDR citizens as "our loyal allies" and cited the "mutual trust, ideological unity and political cohesion of our parties" as well as "intensive economic cooperation and very wide-ranging cultural relations." Brezhnev also gave special recognition to the East Berlin regime's domestic policies, singling out in particular the successful development of a "national consciousness" as well as the GDR's "developed economy, advanced culture and worthy living conditions." In a brief tribute to Honecker, Brezhnev labeled him a "prominent leader of the international communist movement."

HONECKER Honecker's remarks, reported on the 6th by Moscow radio in German and by TASS, as well as the comments of other GDR delegation members repeatedly stressed that the new treaty had raised Soviet-GDR relations to a "new higher level." The GDR party chief also expressed unqualified loyalty to Moscow, affirming in particular the need for "constant coordination" of socialist and communist construction, foreign policy and defense. Further underlining East German orthodoxy, Honecker asserted that the GDR's guiding principle was that the "comprehensive experiences" of the Soviet Union and CPSU were of "general importance" for all communists and "recognition of this truth is an essential element of proletarian internationalism."

* The USSR-Polish treaty, concluded on 8 April 1965, provides for mutual military assistance in the event of an armed attack by "West German forces of militarism and revanchism or by any other state which enters into an alliance with those forces."

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U S S R

SHCHERBITSKIY REVEALS GRAIN SHORTFALL IN UKRAINE

Figures cited at a 29-30 September Ukrainian Central Committee plenum indicate that the Ukraine is heading toward its worst grain harvest since 1972's disastrous shortfall. The figures were revealed in Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy's 30 September concluding speech at the plenum, published in the Ukrainian press on 3 October, and in a short 2 October PRAVDA report on the plenum.

Shcherbitskiy declared that even with extremely bad weather in two out of five years, the average annual grain production in the present five-year period would amount to about 40 million tons. He acknowledged that because of the bad weather, the grain goals would not be reached this year, but asserted that this year's grain harvest would still exceed the annual average for 1966-70 and be "considerably bigger" than 1972's harvest. He declared that 14 million tons of grain would be sold to the state this year.

These figures are very revealing when compared with earlier official figures. The Ukrainian grain harvests reported officially for 1971-74 average 41.6 million tons, broken down as follows:

1974--45.9
1973--48.5 (a record)
1972--32.6
1971--39.4

To bring this average down to the 40 million which Shcherbitskiy predicted, this year's harvest would have to be about 34 million--almost as low as 1972's crop. This calculation was confirmed by Shcherbitskiy's statement that this year's harvest would exceed the average for the 1966-70 five year period, which was 33.4 million, and "considerably" exceed 1972's 32.6 million. This is to put an optimistic face on statements which mean that the harvest would be about 12 million tons less than 1974 and 14-15 million short of the hoped-for 48-49 million tons for 1975.

Shcherbitskiy's Ukrainian grain procurement figure of 14 million tons seems high; in 1972 only 9.2 million tons were procured. Yet that is far below 1973's 17.5 million and 1974's 16.5, and about 2 million short of this year's target. But if 14 million tons were taken by the state, this would be a much larger proportion of the total harvest than in past years: about 41 percent versus 36 percent in 1973 and 1974, and only 28 percent in 1972.

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A bright spot may be wheat procurement: Shcherbitskiy claimed that 9.5 million tons of wheat are being sold to the state, which he termed 50 percent more than planned. This is clearly much more than in 1972, but far short of the 13.2 million tons sold in the record year of 1973.

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NOTES

PRC-U.S. RELATIONS: Peking's coverage of PRC National Day celebrations in the United States was similar to that last year. Thus, NCNA on 1 October noted that Secretary Kissinger attended the anniversary reception at the United Nations hosted by Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and that a large turnout of almost 1,000 people, led by State Department officials, Congressional leaders and a Supreme Court Justice attended the reception at the PRC Liaison Office in Washington. A separate report was issued on New York celebrations sponsored by the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association. A 4 October report noted that "American friend" Lois Snow, a guest at PRC celebrations in Peking, had a "cordial and friendly conversation" that day with the wife of Premier Chou En-lai, Teng Ying-chao. The report noted that Mrs. Snow returned a cap given to Edgar Snow during his visit to the communist base in Shensi Province in 1936, recalling that "Mr. Snow took a very precious picture of Chairman Mao in the very cap, captioned 'Chairman Mao in Northern Shensi.'" In recalling Mao's contact with Snow, NCNA seemed to be pointing up Mao's continued personal approval for Sino-U.S. friendship on the eve of forthcoming visits to China by Secretary Kissinger and President Ford. An earlier indirect signal to this effect had occurred in December 1970, a period of unannounced Sino-U.S. contacts, when PEOPLE'S DAILY printed a picture of Mao and Snow taken on PRC National Day that year.

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: Except for ailing Premier Chou En-lai, who for the first time failed to appear for National Day celebrations, all currently active CCP Politburo leaders publicly welcomed the 26th anniversary of the PRC's founding on 1 October. Trade union leader Ni Chih-fu, who had inexplicably slipped from public view several months ago, reappeared at National Day garden parties in Peking. No new major rehabilitated leaders appeared in Peking for the festivities, but subordinates of two major victims of the cultural revolution--former director of the party's propaganda department Lu Ting-i and the former mayor of Peking, Peng Chen--were reported attending the anniversary eve reception. NCNA on 30 September listed Lu's old deputy director of the propaganda department, Hsu Li-chun, as well as Peng's former subordinates in Peking, Cheng Tien-hsiang, Chen Ko-han, Fan Chih and Tsui Yueh-ii, as "also present" at the reception, an apparent indication they have not yet resumed any official duties. In Shanghai a 1 October broadcast revealed the rehabilitation of former first party secretary Chen Pei-hsien, who was openly attacked and purged in the cultural revolution. His errors included opposing cultural reforms of

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current Politburo members Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan. Chen was listed among a group of Shanghai revolutionary committee standing committee members. Szechwan's top three leaders--party chief Liu Hsing-yuan, Chengtu Military Region commander Chih Chi-wei and ranking party secretary Li Ta-chang--made an unusual joint appearance in Peking for National Day, suggesting central attention to Szechwan local problems.

PEKING, MOSCOW ON JAPAN: Peking has picked up negative Japanese reaction to statements concerning Japan's claim to the "northern territories" in an article by Foreign Minister Gromyko in the CPSU journal KOMMUNIST (No. 14). An NCNA item on 5 October labeled Gromyko's comments as "arrogant," and replayed Tokyo press reports on Japanese foreign ministry concern that the KOMMUNIST article challenges Japan's contention that Moscow had agreed--during former Prime Minister Tanaka's October 1973 visit--that the northern territories issue is still pending. The text of the KOMMUNIST article is not yet available. However, according to a brief Moscow radio account of the article, broadcast in English to Asia on 4 October, Gromyko accused groups in Japan of trying to prevent closer Soviet-Japanese relations by making "unfounded claims to the so-called northern territories," claims he said the Soviet Union would "repel." Also on the 4th, a Moscow commentary in Japanese, accusing Peking of provoking Japan into making territorial claims against the Soviet Union, paraphrased Gromyko as saying that "any attempt to step up territorial claims against the Soviet Union will be duly struck down."

YUGOSLAVIA ON TRIESTE ACCORD: Belgrade has carefully portrayed the Yugoslav-Italian agreement to settle their 21-year-long border dispute over the Trieste territory as advantageous to both countries and promoting European detente. Media comment has closely echoed Foreign Minister Minic's 1 October report on the agreement to the Federal Assembly, in which he labeled it a "joint effort" leading to "balanced solutions" and contributing to a "new positive political climate in Europe in the spirit of Helsinki." Perhaps in anticipation of possible domestic dissatisfaction with the agreement, Minic pointed out that the border republics of Slovenia and Croatia had been consulted during the negotiations. He also implied that Tito had placed his stamp of approval on the agreement, by referring to Tito's "direct participation and special contribution." Media comment also described the accord as a defeat for "bloc" efforts to manipulate individual sovereign countries. BORBA on the 2d, for example, asserted that the agreement had reduced the "possibilities of foreign pressures and interference"

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affecting Italy and Yugoslavia. And Belgrade radio's military-political commentator Dusan Dozet on the 4th described the accord as a "good example" of how two neighboring countries can surmount border disputes "no matter how great the role these border disputes may play in world strategic contests."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE ATTACKS SHORTCOMINGS IN PHILOSOPHY

On 19 September PRAVDA published an editorial article criticizing various shortcomings in the work of the Soviet philosophical establishment--the first such direct public statement on the subject in recent years. The article itself is not a clear-cut call for a purge, since it warns against establishing a monopoly of viewpoints or stifling of ideas, but the very fact that PRAVDA carried such a critical article may provide grounds for conservatives to move more decisively against liberal philosophers. While the motivation behind the article is somewhat obscure, recent events in the field of philosophy suggest that its target is the controversial journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY and its purpose is to brake liberalizing trends in the philosophical establishment.

Underlining the ominous implications of the article is the fact that it appeared only one day after PRAVDA announced that Brezhnev had granted a special audience to and praised the work of K.I. Zarodov, author of a controversial 6 August PRAVDA article arguing a tougher line in political-ideological tactics. This may be more than coincidence, since the journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY has involved itself heavily in international issues recently, vigorously promoting a line opposite to that of Zarodov's PRAVDA article.

Entitled "The High Duty of Soviet Philosophers," the article defines the duty of Soviet philosophers as the obligation to fight for communism and against technocratic theories and other bourgeois and revisionist ideas. It criticizes the Institute of Philosophy and calls for "serious improvement" of the work of the two philosophy journals, QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY and PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES, especially in treating dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Unlike the controversial QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, the prosaic PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES has not been seriously criticized in recent years. Conservatives had managed to force a breakup in the QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial board in mid-1974, but chief editor I.T. Frolov remains and the journal continues to be a vehicle for fresh thought.

The article's thrust is somewhat diluted by its last paragraphs, which insist on preserving "comradely debate or unresolved problems" and warn against "any kind of monopoly of manifestations of groupism, no matter how justified." It condemns as "equally unacceptable"

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both "unjustifiably biting evaluations of innovative scientific work, which leads to stagnation of thought and is convenient only for incompetent persons, as well as ideological-methodological spinelessness and erosion of principle which lead to theoretical and political errors."

EARLIER CONTROVERSY AFFECTING PHILOSOPHY

The timing of the article is puzzling, since the long-standing controversy in the philosophical establishment had appeared to be resolved in mid-1974 with the removal of liberal Institute of Philosophy director B.M. Kedrov and the breakup of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editors. This was the culmination of a growing confrontation between independent-minded philosophers, such as Kedrov and Frolov, and the conservatives led by S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee's science section.

In May 1973 Trapeznikov called a conference of philosophers in his science section and insisted upon a more orthodox approach, complaining that persons "calling themselves innovators" were "vulgarizing" Marxism-Leninism. He warned against the dangers of ideological penetration in an era of detente. Instead of backing down, Kedrov and Frolov went further in demanding a more creative approach and an end to narrowmindedness. In a September 1973 QUESTICNS OF PHILOSOPHY article Kedrov insisted that philosophers must not just "repeat well known truths" but must "really move philosophy forward." Moreover, the September and October 1973 issues of the journal carried a roundtable discussion organized by Kedrov and Frolov together with the Academy of Social Sciences wherein numerous prominent natural and social scientists spoke out for an extension to the social sciences of the freedom of inquiry long observed in the natural sciences. Especially outspoken were the Academy of Social Sciences' representatives, rector M.T. Iovchuk and head of the academy's chair of philosophy, Kh. N. Momdzhyan, the latter directly calling for innovation and assailing those who think that in science you can beat your foes on the head with a club.* Frolov followed this with a daring January 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial calling for

* For details on the Kedrov article and the roundtable discussion, see the 29 May 1974 TRENDS Supplement "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences."

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unrestricted pursuit of truth "no matter how bitter and mercilessly critical it is" and assailing the "cavalry raids" led by untalented hacks against productive and innovative philosophers.*

This editorial came at a time when an investigation of the journal, forced by Trapeznikov, was being concluded. According to Institute of Philosophy deputy director F.T. Arkhuptsev in the June 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Trapeznikov's section had been "expressing alarm" about the journal's work "throughout 1973." A commission of the institute, headed by Arkhuptsev, investigated the journal's work and reported at a 5 February 1974 meeting of the institute's scholarly council (reported in the June 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY). Despite Trapeznikov's pressure, institute director Kedrov, Arkhuptsev and other speakers were easy on Frolov, and he was allowed to defend his work and his January editorial and blame most of the journal's shortcomings on the institute or on the state of philosophy in general.

Possibly because of this protection of Frolov, Kedrov soon afterward was quietly removed as director of the institute and reduced to head of a sector of the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology. In late June or early July the QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial board was shaken up by the Academy of Sciences Presidium. The breakup, announced in the July 1974 issue of the journal as a routine "periodic renovation," dropped five board members, including two liberals who had come under attack, sociologist B.A. Grushin and QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY deputy chief editor M.K. Mamardashvili, and added nine, including Trapeznikov's conservative subordinate N.V. Pilipenko, head of the philosophy sector of the Central Committee, and Academy of Social Sciences rector Iovchuk and deputy rector G. Ye. Glezerman. No significant criticisms accompanied these partial changes, reinforcing the impression that only halfway measures were being taken.**

Since mid-1974 the philosophy sector had appeared to quiet down. Although a broadscale ideological crackdown began in late summer 1974, it included no references to philosophers, whose activities presumably were among the main causes of the crackdown. Nevertheless,

* See the Supplementary Article "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences" in the 3 April 1974 TRENDS.

** Details on the 1974 moves against Kedrov and QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY appear in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, pages 12-16; 24 July 1974, pages 31-32; and 28 August 1974, pages 18-20.

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Frolov's position was clearly weakened by the November 1974 demotion of P.N. Demichev to minister of culture and his subsequent removal as Central Committee secretary in charge of ideology. Frolov had been an assistant to Demichev for several years prior to becoming QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editor in mid-1968 and presumably owed that appointment at least partially to Demichev's influence.

RENEWED CRITICISM OF JOURNAL

While there were no further attacks or moves against the philosophers publicized in the press or professional journals, criticism was being generated in academic circles. The Academy of Social Sciences, which appeared to act as an ally of Frolov in 1973, held a meeting to criticize the work of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY sometime in 1974, according to the August 1975 issue of the journal. This belated publicity for the meeting was the first sign that the journal might be in trouble again.

The meeting was opened by deputy rector Glezermar, who noted that philosophers had some complaints against the journal and suggested that the journal should "more consistently follow the principle of party spirit in social sciences in its discussions." Rector Iuvchuk was absent. Frolov tactfully welcomed criticism, "especially now, after the significant renovation of the editorial collegium." He noted that the journal's work had already been discussed "in various organizations and establishments," singling out "for example" the favorable February 1974 discussion. Other speakers praised the journal for innovation and good work, but some attacked a number of the journal's articles, including those by recently removed deputy editor Mamardashvili and board member Grushin, for poor criticism of bourgeois ideas. Ironically, the harshest criticism came from head of the philosophy chair Momdzhyan, who had so enthusiastically backed the journal's innovative campaign in 1973. He declared that the journal had made "serious errors and shortcomings which caused alarm among the Soviet philosophical community," that the journal "was lagging in the main thing"-- treatment of dialectical materialism and historical materialism-- and that it insufficiently criticized idealism.

A.S. Kovalchuk, onetime deputy editor of the journal, attacked the defiant January 1974 editorial for labeling critics "scientifically unproductive people" who hide behind a mask of "party spirit" and for blaming the journal's shortcomings on the state of philosophy in general. A.F. Okulov attacked the January editorial for downgrading Soviet philosophy and for being insufficiently critical of the journal's own work. Frolov

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2835 items)</u>		<u>Peking (887 items)</u>	
Portuguese President Costa Gomes in USSR	(--) 13%	UNGA 30th Session [Chiao Kuan-hua	(9%) 8% (3%) 4%
Spanish Executions	(--) 12%	Speech	
China [PRC National Day	(6%) 7% (--) 4%]	PRC National Day	(1%) 7%
Gromyko in Czechoslovakia	(--) 2%	Sinkiang Autonomous Region 27th Anniversary	(2%) 4%
UNGA 30th Session	(8%) 2%	PRC Release of Taiwan Prisoners	(2%) 3%
		DRV Party-Government Delegation in PRC	(16%) 2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.